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Abstract. Traditional control environments connected to physical sys-
tems are being upgraded with novel information and communication
technologies. The resulting systems need to be adequately protected.
Experimental testbeds are crucial for the study and analysis of ongo-
ing threats against those resulting cyber-physical systems. The research
presented in this paper discusses some actions towards the development
of a replicable and affordable cyber-physical testbed for training and
research. The architecture of the testbed is based on real-world com-
ponents, and emulates cyber-physical scenarios commanded by SCADA
(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) technologies. We focus on
two representative protocols, Modbus and DNP3. The paper reports as
well the development of some adversarial scenarios, in order to evalu-
ate the testbed under cyber-physical threat situations. Some detection
strategies are evaluated using our proposed testbed.
1 Introduction
Traditional control systems are evolving in an effort to reduce complexity and
cost. These systems are converging into using a shared network layer, enabling
interconnectivity between different manufacturers. Despite all the evident ad-
vantages of joining the communication layer in a shared network, this evolution
also opens the door to the emergence of sophisticated cyber-threats [6,13]. These
threats need to be assessed to offer novel countermeasures to minimize the risk
when using shared communication layers.
Critical services infrastructures, such as water management, transportation
of electricity, rail and air traffic control, belong to systems nowadays coined as
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The impact of any security breach to these en-
vironments can affect the physical integrity of individuals in contact to those
systems. Even basic threats such as replay cyber-physical attacks [22] could po-
tentially cause significant damages if attack detection is not properly undertaken.
Within this scope, our goal is to put in practice solutions of theoretical nature,
modeled and implemented under realistic scenarios, in order to analyze their ef-
fectiveness against intentional attacks. More precisely, we assume cyber-physical
environments operated by SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition)
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technologies and industrial control protocols. We focus on two representative
protocols, which are widely used in the industry: Modbus and DNP3 [5, 16].
Both protocols have TCP enabled versions. This allows us the emulation of
cyber-physical environments under shared network infrastructures. We assume
a Master-Slave design pattern, which mainly dictates that slaves would not ini-
tiate any communication unless a given master requests an initial operation.
One of our objectives has been to combine these two protocols, both to allow
the flexibility and support of several devices with Modbus as well as the secu-
rity enhancements that DNP3 could provide as one of its features. Furthermore,
some cyber-physical detection mechanisms based on challenge-response strate-
gies proposed in [15,20] are embedded in our SCADA testbed to experiment and
analyze with their real-world performance. To complement the testbed, a set
of adversarial scenarios are designed and developed to test attacks against the
emulated environment. These scenarios focus on attacking the Modbus segments
of the SCADA architecture. The final goal is to analyze the effectiveness of novel
security methods implemented upon the emulated environment, and under the
enforcement of some attack models.
Paper Organization — Section 2 provides the background. Section 3 provides
details about the testbed implementation. Section 4 presents some experimental
results. Section 5 provides related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 SCADA Technologies
We assume Cyber-Physical Systems operated by SCADA technologies and In-
dustrial Control Protocols. SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition)
technologies are composed of well-defined types of field devices, such as: (1) Mas-
ter Terminal Units (MTUs) and Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), located at
the topmost layer and managing device communications; (2) Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), controlling and ac-
quiring data from remote equipment and connecting with the master stations;
and (3) sensors and actuators.
The MTUs of a SCADA system are located at the control center of the or-
ganization. The MTUs give access to the management of communications, data
storage, and control of sensors and actuators connected to RTUs. The interface
to the administrators is provided via the HMIs. The RTUs are stand-alone data
acquisition and control units. Their tasks are twofold: (1) to control and acquire
data from process equipment (at the remote sites); and (2) to communicate
the collected data to a master (supervision) station. Modern RTUs may also
communicate between them (either via wired or wireless networks). The PLCs
are small industrial microprocessor-based computers. The significant differences
with respect to an RTU are in size and capability. Sensors are monitoring devices
responsible for retrieving measurements related to specific physical phenomena,
Security of Cyber-Physical Systems 3
and communicate such measurements to the controllers. Actuators translate con-
trol signals to actions that are needed to correct the dynamics of the system, via
the RTUs and PLCs.
2.2 Industrial Control Protocols
Protocols for industrial control systems built upon SCADA technologies must
cover regulation rules such as delays and faults [2]. However, few protocols im-
posed by industrial standards provide security features in the traditional ICT
security sense. Details about two representative SCADA protocols used in our
work follow.
Modbus – One of the first protocols that stands out when working with data
acquisition systems is Modbus [16]. It was developed around the 80’s and it was
done with no security concerns as was common at that time. It was developed by
Modicon to be used with their PLCs. The protocol was formulated as a method
to transmit data between electrical devices over serial lines. In the standard
working mode, Modbus has a master and slave architecture, something really
common for half duplex communications. The protocol is free and open source,
making it really popular among the automation industry. The protocol evolved
to allow different communication technologies. For instance, Modbus ASCII, for
serial communications; and Modbus TCP/IP for Ethernet networks.
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) – As with Modbus, DNP3 is a
query-response protocol for process automation systems. Messages are sent over
serial bus connections or Ethernet networks (using the TCP/IP stack) [5]. The
protocol recently has been leaning towards a more security-oriented design. Pre-
vious versions of the protocol suffered from the same kind of design conception
where security was not taken into account, due to the inherent level of security
that dedicated networks provided by this protocol.
2.3 Control-theoretic Protection
Cyber-physical systems operated by SCADA technologies and industrial control
protocols can be represented as closed-loop systems. Such systems follow closely
the pattern of controlling the system based on the feedback they are getting
from measurements. Several control-theoretic solutions have been presented in
the literature to detect attacks against cyber-physical systems. In [24], some
techniques are presented to improve the security of networked control systems
using control theory. A proper example is the use of authentication watermarks.
Stationary watermarks, i.e., Gaussian zero-mean distributed signals, are added
to the control signals, in order to identify integrity attacks against the system.
The watermark-based detector can identify the effect of real distribution values,
generated at the output, with regard to, e.g., replayed or injected distribution
values [15]. However, adversaries with enough resources to infer the dynamics of
the protected system can evade detection [20]. Indeed, there are several meth-
ods that a potential attacker can use to identify and learn the behavior of the
system [1]. The goal of these techniques is to obtain a mathematical model of
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the system, based on eavesdropped measurements. Non-parametric system iden-
tification techniques include the use of adaptive filters, such as Finite Impulse
Response (FIR) filters. Some more powerful techniques to identify complex dy-
namic systems include the use of autoregressive methods, such as ARX (autore-
gressive exogenous model) and ARMAX (autoregressive-moving-average model
with exogenous inputs model) [26]. These techniques can be used by malicious
adversaries, in order to estimate the parameters of the system prior executing
their attacks. Improvements to address those aforementioned problems have been
presented in [19, 20]. The goal of the testbed presented in the following section
is to validate the effectiveness of the aforementioned techniques. Data derived
from the testbed is expected to complement theoretical and numeric simulations
provided in previous work.
3 Testbed Design
3.1 Architecture
Closed-loop systems are systems which rely upon internally gathered informa-
tion to perform, correct, change or even stop actions. This kind of systems are
important in the control theory branch, known to have two-way communication,
one to read data and the other to forward commands.
We can observe three important block elements: the controller, the system
itself, and the sensors. The controller reads data from the sensors, computes new
information and transmit new commands to the system (i.e., the system control
input). The system control input is generated by the controller with the purpose
of correcting the behavior of the system, under some previously established lim-
its. The system is what we normally see as the entity under control. The sensors
are the feedback link between the system and the controller. Their purpose is to
quantify the output and provide the necessary information to the controller, in
order to compare and, if necessary, correct the behavior of the system.
The architecture proposed for our SCADA testbed works as follows. All the
aforementioned elements can be distributed across several nodes in a shared net-
work combining DNP3 and Modbus protocols (cf. Figure 3.1). Likewise, one or
Fig. 3.1. Abstract architecture overview.
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various elements can be embedded into a single device. From a software stand-
point, the controller never connects directly to the sensors. Instead, it is inte-
grated in the architecture as a SCADA PLC (Programmable Logic Controller)
node, with eventual connections to some other intermediary nodes. Such nodes
are able to translate the controller commands into SCADA (e.g., either Mod-
bus or DNP3) commands. As depicted in Figure 3.1, the architecture is able to
handle several industrial protocols and connect to complementary SCADA ele-
ments, such as additional PLCs and RTUs (Remote Terminal Units). To evolve
the architecture into a complete testbed, new elements can be included in the
system, such as additional proxy-like RTU nodes.
From a data transmission standpoint, we include in our SCADA testbed
the possibility of using different sampling frequencies, in order to cover a larger
number of experimental scenarios. The implementation is based on control theory
[19] supporting the use of different frequencies when performing read and write
operations. Specifically, this narrows to the sampling frequency, a system with
mono-frequency sampling is where the same frequency is used for all the channels
or multi-frequency sampling where different sampling frequencies are used in
each channel. Depending on the nature of the system mono or multi is better.
The architecture is able to handle many PLCs. To avoid overloading one
channel with all the possible registers of the PLCs, separate ports are desig-
nated in order to isolate the communication between separated PLCs. DNP3
commands perform an Integrity Scan which gathers all the data from the PLCs
in case several PLCs were being handled in the same channel, all variables of
the a PLC would be fetched causing overhead in the communication.
3.2 Implementation Design
The implementation of our SCADA testbed consists on Lego Mindstorms EV3
bricks [18] and Raspberry Pi [12] boards as PLCs to control some representative
sensors (e.g., distance sensors) and actuators (e.g., speed actuators). We refer
the reader to http://j.mp/legoscada for additional information. Figure 3.2
shows an object-oriented representation of the testbed implementation, along
with connection control classes, exception classes and also graphical interface
classes at the controller side. In Figure 3.3, we can see all the classes that have
been created in order to achieve the DNP3-Modbus combination, at the RTU
side. A proxy-like behavior has been also implemented allowing to translate the
commands in both directions for both protocols.
Controller Design — The controller has a graphical interface to show the
behavior of the system to an operator. It is orchestrated by the ControlCenter
class (cf. Figure 3.2). This class handles the graphical interface (cf. HomeFrame
class) representing the HMI (Human Machine Interface) of the SCADA archi-
tecture. Some PLC instances, e.g., the Car instances, subsequently create DNP3
connections under a DataHandler, which is in charge of managing the commu-
nications between RTUs and PLCs. Finally, some of the instances (e.g., the Car
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instance) implement a graphical component to provide additional information
to the operator.
RTU Design — In the implementation, it is possible to have control of one or
more PLC instances. For such a task, a dedicated thread manages the transla-
tions and constant polling of each PLC. Everything starts with the MainRTU
class (cf. Figure 3.3), which opens the main DNP3 connection to expect the
controller. Once the controller connects, the RTUs exchange information of the
PLCs to add, and create all the respective classes in order to handle each PLC
individually and with dedicated ports.
External Tools — Apart from the architecture implementation, other tools
have been implemented in order to facilitate the aggregation process of new
SCADA nodes. Specific custom scripts have been made to install the OpenDNP3
libraries either compiling them from source or use precompiled binaries for the
case of the Raspberry Pi. Compiling source is time-consuming if it is done directly
at the Raspberry Pi boards. Therefore, cross-compiling or precompiled libraries
Fig. 3.2. Implementation overview, controller side.
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Fig. 3.3. Implementation overview, RTU side.
are recommended to avoid long compilation times. The Raspbian scripts give
the choice to use precompiled libraries.
3.3 Test Scenario Description
Figure 3.4 shows the components of a test scenario. This scenario is a simple rep-
resentation of the architecture proposed in this paper. It consists of a controller
(Personal Computer), an RTU (Raspberry Pi) and a PLC (Lego EV3 Brick). The
controller is always correcting the car speed and polling the distance between
the car and an obstacle. One single controller and one single RTU can control
various PLCs. To start the testbed is necessary to launch the Java program on
the brick [23], and the intermediary Java software in the Raspberry Pi board.
When starting the controller and adding a car, the controller communicates with
Fig. 3.4. Test scenario overview (cf. http://j.mp/legoscada).
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each layer to perform the request. The car behavior is continually being modified
by the controller hence varying the car speed many times per second.
3.4 Implementation of MiM Attacks
Man-in-the-middle (MiM) is a very common type of attack, compromising the
communication in both ends, especially if the communication is not encrypted
as is the case with many SCADA implementations. As mentioned previously, the
watermark detectors reported in [19, 20] are implemented in our testbed. The-
oretical proofs and numeric simulations were already conducted to validate the
proposed detectors. The testbed proposed in this paper was expected to provide
complementary validation of the detectors. After having an entire architecture
working, the next requirement was to implement the adversarial scenarios re-
ported in [19,20].
In order to develop the scenarios, an attacker model was used as a base for
assumptions to define the opponents’ capabilities. We assume that the attacker
can intercept all communication between ends, and thus the attacker can alter,
store, analyze replay and forge false data in the communication. Since this is done
using a testbed instead of numeric simulations, all real-life limitations are ap-
plied to the attacker. ARP poisoning [17] is used by the attacker to intercept the
channels and eavesdrop the communications. The attacker has a passive and ac-
tive mode of operation. The passive mode is where the attacker only eavesdrops,
processes, and analyzes the data without modifying the information contained
in the payload of the messages. Nevertheless, Ethernet header data, such as the
hardware addresses, are modified since ARP tables are poisoned. During the
active mode, the attacker starts injecting data to the hijacked communication.
This injection, depending on the pattern of the attacker, can be a generated
response or replayed packets.
Replay Attack — The attacker uses ARP poisoning to start eavesdropping the
connection (passive mode). After capturing enough data, the active mode starts.
The attacker injects the old captured data following the stream of packets of the
previous capture. Before starting to disrupt the system, the attacker conducts
the attack between the sensors and the controller, forging only the TCP headers
that correspond to the opened TCP sessions. Once replayed the packets, the
system gets disrupted by forging data between the controller and the PLCs.
Injection Attacks — Prior to starting the attacks, the attacker eavesdrops
connections using the passive mode, and analyze the data in order to infer the
dynamics of the system. This is used to evade the authentication watermark de-
tector. Once inferred the model of the system, the attacker starts injecting correct
data in the communication in order to defeat the watermark countermeasure.
To delude the detector, the attacker calculates the effect of the watermark in the
system and tries to cancel the ability of the detector to sense the changes in the
feedback signal. Two different techniques are implemented: 1) a non-parametric
Security of Cyber-Physical Systems 9
filter, called Finite Impulse Response filter (FIR), in order to implement the eva-
sion technique presented in [20]; and 2) autoregressive methods, such as ARX
and ARMAX, in order to implement the evasion technique presented in [19].
3.5 Attack and Fault Detection
The adaptation of a fault detector in order to detect attacks using an authenti-
cation watermark is a valid technique that has been proved to work in [15,19,20].
The aforementioned techniques have been implemented in our SCADA testbed,
in order to assess and analyze their performance using real hardware compo-
nents. The testbed controllers have built-in the detector with different types of
watermarks (cf. Section 2.3). The implementation uses the JKalman library [4],
with some light modifications to parameterize the system and detect the effect of
the watermark in the system’s output. The detector estimates the next output
of the system and then compares it to the value returned by the system. The
process uses the χ2 detector proposed in [15]. The detector returns a metric, gt,
which increases rapidly when the output of the system starts to move away from
the estimation. The metric is posteriorly used to generate alerts.
The gt metric is an in-code operator that quantifies the difference between
the parametric model output and the actual system output. An increase of gt
means that the system is not behaving or reacting to the watermark as expected.
Therefore, the system is likely to be under attack. The value of gt is calculated for
each iteration and compared with the values of some previous iterations. In order
to discard false positives, the controller implements the validation code presented
in Algorithm 1, to separate normal faults from attacks or severe failures. The
algorithm alerts the operator only when real intervention is required, making the
differentiation between faults, e.g., latency or inaccuracy events at the sensor;
and intentional attacks. For every feedback sample, the controller analyzes gt.
If gt consecutively bypasses a given threshold more than window times, then it
triggers an alert.
Algorithm 1 — Fault and Attack Detector
1: procedure detection algorithm
2: window← detector window
3: loop:
4: if gt ≥ threshold then
5: risk ← risk + 1.
6: if risk > window then
7: alert← alert+ 1.
8: else
9: risk ← 0.
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4 Experimentation and Results
4.1 Experimentation
We present in this section the results of applying the watermark authentication
technique presented in [19,20] under the testbed presented in Section 3. Several
repetitions of the experiment were orchestrated using automated scripts handling
the elements of our SCADA testbed scenarios. The scripts can perform several
actions, such as starting the controller and the RTUs, as well as executing the
predefined attacks. A set of attacks and detectors have been used and posteriorly
analyzed. The combinations, attack–detector, are the following:
– Replay Attack–Watermark Disabled: the attacker is likely to evade the de-
tector, since no watermark is injected into the system.
– Replay Attack–Watermark Enabled: the attacker is likely identified by the
detector, since the attack is not able to adapt to the current watermark.
– Non-parametric Attack–Stationary Watermark: attacker and detector have
equal chances of success.
– Non-parametric Attack–Non-stationary Watermark: the non-stationary wa-
termark changes the distribution systematically, hence preventing the FIR-
based attack to adapt to such changes. The expected results are an increase
of the detection ratio.
– Parametric Attack–Stationary Watermark: the attacker is likely to evade the
detector when the attack properly infers the system parameters.
– Parametric Attack–Non-stationary Watermark: the attacker is also likely to
evade the detector when the system parameters are properly identified.
The cyber-physical implications of the testbed hinder the experimentation
process especially when several repetitions are required in order to obtain sta-
tistical results, contrary to simulations where only the code is executed. The
creation of the orchestration script, which automates the test, has been neces-
sary to simplify the experimentation tasks. Next section shows the results using
the testbed for the aforementioned attacker-detector combinations. A sample
execution of the Replay Attack – Watermark Disabled scenario is available at
http://j.mp/legoscada.
4.2 Experimental Results
After collecting data from different devices across the SCADA testbed, the data
is analyzed accordingly to interpret the performance of the detector with regard
to the attack scenario. Since the stationary watermark detector was correctly
refined for each test scenario, we are able to analyze in depth the results through
a statistical evaluation of the data. Experimental results with the non-stationary
watermark mechanism are also conducted. Figure 4.1 shows the detector values,
gt, for all the attack-detector combinations defined in Section 4.1.
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parametric attack
Fig. 4.1. Detection results. The horizontal solid line represents the threshold. The ver-
tical dotted line represents the moment when the attack starts. Peaks on the left side
of the vertical dotted line represent false positives. (a),(b) detection values of gt, with-
out and with stationary watermark under replay attack. (c),(d) detection values with
stationary and non-stationary watermark under non-parametric attack. And (e),(f) de-
tection values with stationary and non-stationary watermark under parametric attack.
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For all the plots, the solid horizontal line represents the threshold; and the
vertical dotted line represents the moment when the attacker starts injecting
malicious data. The short peaks on the left side of the plots, those bypassing
the threshold line before the start of the attacks, are counted as false positives
or system faults.
Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) show the experimental results of the replay attack.
When the watermark was disabled (cf. Figure 4.1(a)), the attacker properly
evades the detector. Since the controller is not inserting the protection water-
mark, it does not detect the attack. On the contrary, the results in Figure 4.1(b)
show that the activation of the watermark under the same scenario allows the
controller to alert about the attack almost immediately. Based on these results,
we can conclude that the stationary watermark based detector properly works
out to detect the replay attack.
Figure 4.1(c) represents the non-parametric attacker against the previously
tested stationary watermark. The detector is now unable to detect the attacker.
Figure 4.1(d) shows the case where the non-stationary watermark is enabled.
Under this situation, the detector has lightly more chances of detecting the
attack. This shows how the non-stationary watermark mechanism does improve
the detection abilities compared to the stationary watermark approach.
Figures 4.1(e) and 4.1(f) evaluate the scenario associated to the parametric
attacks. Theoretically, the attacker is expected to evade the detector when the
attack succeeds at properly identifying the parameters of the system dynamics.
Figure 4.1(e) represents the experiments where the parametric attack is executed
under the stationary watermark scenario. The figure shows that the detector
value, gt, remains most of the time below the detection threshold. Figure 4.1(f)
shows the behavior of the detector under the non-stationary watermark scenario.
This time, the detector has slightly more chances of detecting the attack.
4.3 Statistical Data Evaluation
Using the watermark-based detection mechanism, we run for each attack scenario
75 automated rounds (about 4 hours of data collection processing). In order to
evaluate the results, we use the following metrics:
1. Detection Ratio, associated to the success percentage of the detector, calcu-
lated with regard to time range after each attack starts.
2. Average Detection Time, determining the amount of time needed by the
detector to trigger the attack alert.
3. False Negative (FN) ratio, determining the number of samples where the de-
tector fails at successfully alerting about the attacks. The ratio is calculated
as follows,
FN =
SA−AD
SA
(4.1)
where SA represents the values of the samples under attack, and AD the
samples detected as an attack.
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4. False Positives (FP) ratio, calculated as the number of samples where the
detector signals benign events as attacks. The ratio is calculated as follows,
FP =
AD
SN
(4.2)
where SN represents the number of samples under normal operation, and
AD the number of samples detected as attack by mistake.
Table 1 shows the performance results of the detector, based on the Detection
Ratio and the Average detection Time metrics.
Replay Attack
Non-parametric
Attack
Parametric
Attack
Detection Ratio 40.00% 18.00% 12.00%
Average Detection Time 18.81s 10.17s 6.08s
Table 1. Detector performance results.
Regarding the results shown in Table 1, we can emphasize that the replay
attack is the most detectable scenario, with a detection ratio of about 40%. This
detection ratio is still far from perfect, maybe due to the sensors accuracy and
resolution; but better than for the rest of scenarios. The non-parametric attacker
has a lower detection ratio, of about 18%. This result is expected, as suggested
by the theoretical and simulation-based conclusions available at [20], where the
authors emphasize that the mechanism is not sufficiently robust to detect adver-
saries that are able to identify the system model. To finish, the parametric attack
has the most robust system identification approach. The attacks can evade the
detection process if they succeed at properly identifying the system attributes.
In terms of results, they lead to the lowest detection rate of about 12%.
During the replay attack, the Average Detection Time is the slowest of all
the adversarial scenarios. This behavior is due to the watermark distribution
properties, since the watermark variation makes the replay attack highly de-
tectable. At the same time, the injection attacks (either the parametric or the
non-parametric version) are detected much faster than the replay attack. This is
due to the transition period needed by the attackers to estimate the correct data
prior misleading the detector. For this reason, if the attacker does not choose the
precise moment to start the attack, the detector implemented at the controller
side is able to detect the injected data, right at the beginning of the attack.
Furthermore, the attackers shall also synchronize their estimations to the mea-
surements sent by the sensors. In case of failing the synchronization process, the
detector does identify the uncorrelated data, and reports the attack.
Table 2 shows that the detection of the replay attack has the lowest false
negative ratio, 64.06%, hence confirming that this adversarial scenario is the most
detectable situation with regard to the detection techniques reported in [15]. The
detection of the non-parametric attacks has a higher false negative ratio, 85.20%,
confirming the theoretical and simulation-based results reported in [20]. The
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detection of the parametric attacks also confirms the results estimated in [19],
and leading to the highest false negative ratio, 88.63%. Finally, and in terms
of false positive ratio, the three adversarial scenarios show a low impact (on
average, about 1.33% false positive ratio). Such low impact is, moreover, easy to
tune by adapting the parameters of Algorithm 1.
Replay Attack
Non-parametric
Attack
Parametric
Attack
False Negatives 64.06% 85.20% 88.63%
False Positives 0.98% 1.66% 1.35%
Table 2. Long run experiment results.
5 Related Work
The study of security incidents associated to cyber-physical systems underlying
critical infrastructures has gathered a big amount of attention since the infamous
Stuxnet case [13]. Since then, research on cyber-physical systems has progressed
substantially resulting in a large number of testbeds developed and established
in the literature. A non-exhaustive list follows.
Myat-Aung present in [9] a Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) simulation
and testbed to test defense mechanisms against a variety of attacks. Siaterlis
et al. [21] define a cyber-physical Experimentation Platform for Internet Contin-
gencies (EPIC) that is able to study multiple independent infrastructures and to
provide information about the propagation of faults and disruptions. Green et
al. [7] focus their work on an adaptive cyber-physical testbed where they include
different equipments, diverse networks, and also business processes. Yardley re-
ports in [25] a cyber-physical testbed based on commercial tools in order to
experimentally validate emerging research and technologies. The testbed com-
bines emulation, simulation, and real hardware to experiment with smart grid
technologies. Krotofil and Larsen show in [11] several testbeds and simulations
concluding that a successful attack against their envisioned systems has to man-
age cyber and physical knowledge.
From a more control-theoretic standpoint, Candell et al. report in [3] a
testbed to analyze the performance of security mechanisms for cyber-physical
systems. The work reports as well discussions from control and security practi-
tioners. McLaughlin et al. analyze in [14] different testbeds and conclude that
it is necessary to use pathways between cyber and physical components of the
system in order to detect attacks. Also, Koutsandria et al. [10] implement a
testbed where the data are cross-checked, using cyber and physical elements.
Holm et al. survey, classify and analyze in [8] several cyber-physical testbeds
proposed for scientific research. Inline with the aforementioned contributions,
we have presented in this paper an ongoing testbed that aims at evaluating
research mitigation techniques targeting attacks at the physical layer of cyber-
physical systems operated via SCADA protocols. The initial focus of our testbed
has been the evaluation of the control-theoretic security mechanisms reported
in [15,19,20].
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6 Conclusion
In pursuance of security testing in cyber-physical systems, this paper has pro-
vided a practical description of an ongoing platform to test theoretical cyber-
physical defense techniques. The architecture of the testbed is based on real-
world components, in order to emulate cyber-physical systems commanded by
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) technologies. Two real-
world protocol implementations are included within our platform.
Three types of adversarial scenarios were also integrated in our testbed. The
three scenarios enforce different types of attackers, incrementing the usability of
the testbed to experiment novel security methods against a wider variety of ma-
licious intents. All three scenarios were confronted against representative defense
techniques. The platform also implements testing automation in order to provide
larger datasets as results and enabling the architecture to perform repetitive
tests. Experimental results confirm previous theoretical and simulation-based
work.
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